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Overview 
The sharing economy for services like Uber and Airbnb has grown significantly. The 
growth is driven by technology that “whittled down the barriers to the formation and functioning 
of sharing markets by lowering or eliminating frictions in the identification, search, match, 
verification, and exchange” (Narasimhan et al 2017). 
Reductions in friction in steps to consummate transactions offer two types of savings to 
consumers. One, monetary savings, results from lower prices typically offered by sharing economy 
providers (SEP’s) relative to legacy providers (LP’s). The second type of savings results from the 
reduced effort and/or time that consumers need to search, identify, and transact with providers. 
Thus, a consumer does not have to wait for a taxi to pass by and can instead hail a ride on Uber. A 
traveler can find an accommodation at a preferred spot in a city easily even in the absence of 
traditional hotels at that spot. Such reductions in the time and/ or effort needed to locate desired 
services result in what we label as hassle savings. 
While they may not be able to compete on monetary savings, LP’s can still provide hassle 
savings. For instance, although they may cost more, by being more readily available, traditional 
cabs in a city like New York can help riders save the time to hail and wait for Uber. Whether 
consumers weigh monetary or hassle savings more may, however, vary with the consumption 
iii 
 
context. For instance, avoiding the wait time for an Uber ride by taking a passing by taxi may 
weigh more if the ride is short and the savings are not substantial. The opposite may be true, 
however, for long rides where the difference in the cost of Uber and traditional taxis could be quite 
large. Monetary and/or hassle savings can, therefore, be strategic variables for LP’s and SEP’s. I 
examine if this is the case empirically in my dissertation through three essays on the sharing 
economy. 
Essay 1: Monetary and Hassle Savings as Strategic Variables in the Ride-Sharing Market 
The setting for my first essay is the ride-sharing market where I examine consumers’ 
choices between Yellow Taxi and Uber in New York City. Specifically, I assume that consumers 
will weigh monetary savings less than hassle savings if the former is below a threshold but that 
the opposite will be true for larger savings. I investigate if this is the case using data on paid rides 
on Yellow Taxi and Uber in New York City. The period of my investigation lies between April 1, 
2014 and September 30, 2014, during which data on all rides taken on Yellow Taxi’s and Uber is 
available from the city. 
I focus my investigation on the hundred most frequently occurring latitude, longitude, 
combinations from where rides on Yellow Taxis originate in the city. I then relate the odds of 
riders in these neighborhoods choosing Uber over Yellow Taxi for a ride on different days of the 
week and at different times of the day to my primary variable of interest - the availability of Yellow 
Taxis. I operationalize availability as a one-week lagged proportion of the total of rides on Yellow 
Taxis from the neighborhood to the total rides on Yellow Taxi in NYC. I also consider other factors 
like the intrinsic preference for Uber in that neighborhood and in New York City as a whole, 
weather, time of day, and type of neighborhood. 
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If my assumption about the relative importance of monetary and hassle savings is valid, 
there should be a ride distance below which Yellow Taxis should be preferred for the hassle 
savings and above which Uber should be preferred for the monetary savings. I find this indeed to 
be the case at a threshold of 6.64 miles. 
Given the potential endogeneity of availability of Yellow Taxis, I take two approaches to 
assess the reliability of my finding. First, I assume that the availability of Yellow Taxis in each 
neighborhood could be endogenous with the demand for and availability of paid transportation in 
the neighborhood. Specifically, I recalibrate my model including two additional covariates as 
proxies for demand and availability of paid transportation: number of rides taken on subways 
closest to the neighborhood at the time of the ride and the distance to the nearest subway station. 
Two, I jointly estimate a supply side equation for the availability of Yellow Taxis in the 
neighborhood at the time of the ride as a function of a 1-week lagged availability of Yellow Taxis 
in the same neighborhood at the time of the ride and the demand for and availability of public 
transportation. I include the residual from this equation as an additional covariate in the log-odds 
model. Findings from both models are very similar to and consistent with those from the proposed 
model and confirm that there is a threshold distance below (above) which Yellow Taxis (Uber) is 
the preferred option. 
Essay 2: Variations in the Strategic Value of Hassle Savings  
The accommodation sharing market is the setting for my second and third essays. 
Accommodations are experience goods because amenities and the quality of services may vary 
from provider to provider, increasing consumers’ uncertainty. Consumers, therefore, seek 
information on the features of accommodations before choosing one. Standardization mostly 
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provides this information in the case of legacy providers like branded hotels. Sharing economy 
providers, however, cannot rely on standardization since the rented personal accommodations do 
vary across providers. Consumers, therefore, need to rely on alternative sources of information 
like user-generated ratings and reviews. Ratings and Reviews thus provide hassle savings by 
reducing uncertainty and can, therefore, be a strategic variable in the accommodation market. I 
investigate its effect in my second essay. 
In the first essay, I examined variations in the relative value of monetary and hassle savings 
with consumption context.  In this essay, I investigate whether the value of hassle savings itself 
varies with consumption context.  If it does, the strategic role of features that provide hassle savings 
to sharing economy customers will also vary for providers.  Providers should then invest more in 
features that provide hassle savings in contexts where they are valued more but can reduce such 
investments in other contexts.   
Specifically, my goal is to understand if hosts obtain price premiums for receiving higher 
ratings from guests and how those premiums vary across consumption contexts, which I 
operationalize as different types of accommodations and regions within the city.  Airbnb guests 
realize hassle savings by relying on ratings provided by other guests to reduce uncertainty about 
the features and services of listings.  The value of the savings should, therefore, be higher in 
consumption contexts with greater uncertainty.   
I hypothesize that uncertainty is likely to be higher under two consumptions contexts.  One, 
where the number of listings in a location is very large. Two, where the number of listings and 
hence the number of ratings is small. I investigate if these are indeed the patterns by estimating a 
hedonic model of rental prices for Airbnb listings between April 2016 and October 2017 in the 
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five boroughs of New York City for three types of accommodations: (1) entire – a house or 
apartment rented in its entirety (2) private – one room in an apartment and (c) shared – an 
accommodation shared by multiple guests.  In each of the borough-type combinations, I assume 
that listings that receive an average rating of 5.0 are the treatment group and those with ratings of 
4.0 – 4.99 are part of the control group.  I then use propensity score matching to identify the 
treatment and control samples for each of the combinations.  Estimates of the effect of a higher 
rating on the price premium are consistent with my hypotheses. Premiums are higher in 
combinations that have fewer listings or have a large number of listings. 
Essay 3: Social Relationships as Strategic Variable in the Accommodation-Sharing 
Market 
In addition to reviews and ratings (as in Essay 2), an additional source that sharing economy 
providers have been offering is information on whether the host or any previous buyers of a shared 
accommodation are acquaintances of a prospective renter. Airbnb, for instance, offers this through 
a feature called social connections that allows visitors to see only those accommodations reviewed 
by their friends or friends of friends on Facebook. The feature thus provides hassle savings by 
reducing uncertainty (perceived risk) and can, therefore, be a strategic variable in the 
accommodation market. I investigate its effect in my third essay. 
My empirical analysis involves data on the search and time to the first purchase of a sharing 
accommodation by those who register on the Airbnb site.  I examine two outcomes: (1) whether 
or not a purchase occurs (2) time to purchase if one occurs.  The data includes Airbnb consumer 
prospects who registered between January 2014 and June 2014. I select consumer prospects who 
have used social connection feature at least once and use a proportional hazards model to relate 
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time to first purchase to my primary variable of interest – social connections.  I operationalize 
social connections as the number of times that a registered user uses the social connections feature 
before making the first purchase or terminating the search without a purchase. I also control for 
the effects of demographics (gender and age), how a registered user first arrived at the Airbnb site 
(e.g., via a link on Facebook or a search engine), and the number devices she uses for accessing 
the Airbnb site.  I model the occurrence of the purchase/non-purchase of an accommodation as a 
binary logit related to the same variables and model the two outcomes jointly.  My findings indicate 
a significant effect of social connections in reducing the time to, and increasing the likelihood of, 
the first purchase.   
The social connections variable could, however, be endogenous with search time.  Those 
who have friends on Facebook may be more experienced online users and hence, faster in 
searching and more willing to purchase, online. Additionally, they may be using the social 
connections feature only because it allows them to see which of their friends may be hosts or had 
used accommodations they are also considering. I take two approaches to investigate whether there 
are alternative explanations for my findings.  First, I use propensity score matching with visitors 
who use the social connections feature on Airbnb as the treatment group matched with those who 
do not use this feature and re-estimate my models on the pooled sample.  I use signup method 
which indicates whether people used Facebook/Google to set up an account on Airbnb before 
searching for accommodations.  I also use age as a matching variable as a proxy for experience 
with- and interest in- using social media and learning about friends’ activities.  Results from this 
re-estimation are consistent with my findings and indicate that social connections are indeed 
reducing search time and increasing the likelihood of a purchase.   
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Second, I exploit possible geographic differences in the hassle savings’ value of social 
connections to validate my findings.  Specifically, I hypothesize that the value of hassle savings 
should be larger when someone is searching internationally rather than domestically in the US 
since uncertainty should be higher with the former.  I therefore re-estimate my model with 
geographic-specific estimates of the effects of social connections.  I do find that the effects are 
larger both on the time to make the first purchase and on the likelihood of the first purchase for 
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Essay 1: Monetary and Hassle Savings as Strategic Variables in the Ride-Sharing Market 
1.1 Introduction 
Sharing economy providers host digital platforms through which individuals can sell 
services to other individuals (Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012, Zervas et al 2014). Examples of these 
platforms include Airbnb for accommodation, Peerby for appliances and equipment, Eatfeastly for 
dining, and Uber for transportation.  A recent survey by PwC (PwC 2015) suggests that about 44% 
of US consumers are aware of the sharing economy and 19% have engaged in at least one sharing 
economy transaction.  
Due to the rising interest among consumers, the sharing economy has been growing 
rapidly.  For example, Uber entered New York City in May 2011 and currently offers more than 
46,000 cars far exceeding the 14,000 Yellow Taxis in the city (The New York Times 2017). 
Perhaps reflecting this, the average number of daily trips on Yellow Taxis fell by more than 
132,000 trips – about 26% – in June 2016 from the same month in 2011 (TLC 2016).  Similarly, 
Airbnb which had more than 50,000 listings in New York City in 2015 is estimated to have cost 
the NYC hotel industry $451 million in lost revenue during the twelve-month period ending in 
August 2015 (HVS 2015).  As consumer interest in buying through sharing platforms continues to 
increase, the revenue of this segment of the economy is predicted to reach $335 billion by 2025 
globally (PwC 2015).  
The rapid growth of sharing economy is driven by technology that “whittled down the 
barriers to the formation and functioning of sharing markets by lowering or eliminating frictions 
in the identification, search, match, verification, and exchange” (Narasimhan et al 2017). These 




One, monetary savings, results from lower prices typically offered by sharing economy providers 
(SEP’s) relative to legacy providers (LP’s).  The second type of savings results from reduced effort 
and/or time that consumers need to search, identify, and transact with providers.  Thus, a consumer 
does not have to wait for a taxi to pass by and can instead hail a ride on Uber. A traveler can find 
an accommodation at a preferred spot in a city easily even in the absence of traditional hotels at 
that spot. Such reductions in the time and/ or effort needed to locate desired services result in what 
we label as hassle savings.   
While they may not be able to compete on monetary savings, LP’s can still provide hassle 
savings.  For instance, although they may cost more, by being more readily available, traditional 
cabs in a city like New York can help riders save the time to hail and wait for Uber. Whether 
consumers weigh monetary or hassle savings more may, however, vary with the consumption 
context.  For instance, avoiding the wait time for an Uber ride by taking a passing by taxi may 
weigh more if the ride is short and the savings are not substantial.  The opposite may be true 
however for long rides where the difference in the cost of Uber and traditional taxis could be quite 
large.  Monetary and/or hassle savings can, therefore, be strategic variables for LP’s and SEP’s.  
we examine if this is the case empirically in this research.  
The setting for this research is the ride-sharing market where we examine consumers’ 
choices between Yellow Taxi and Uber in New York City. Specifically, we assume that consumers 
will weigh monetary savings less than hassle savings if the former is below a threshold but that 
the opposite will be true for larger savings. 
We empirically test the above predictions in New York City.  In particular, we investigate 




the availability of Yellow Taxi in these markets affects consumer preferences for the two options 
based on the distance traveled on the ride.  Data for our investigation comes from an individual 
investigator who compiled and made some of the data that we use publicly available for research 
(Schneider 2015) and the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC 2017).  This 
Commission maintains detailed records of every ride on Yellow Taxis in the city including 
variables like the origination and termination points of the trip, the trip cost, the start and end times, 
the number of passengers on the ride, and whether the fare was paid with cash or a credit card. 
The specific neighborhoods that we investigate are the top one hundred most frequently 
occurring latitude, longitude, combinations from where rides on Yellow Taxis originate in New 
York City between April 1, 2014 and September 30, 2014, which is a period during which trip-
level data on all rides provided by Uber in the city are also available. To infer availability of Yellow 
Taxis in each neighborhood, we take advantage of the fact that they have to be available and visible 
in the neighborhood to be hailed and use one-week lagged total Yellow Taxi rides as a proportion 
of all rides on Yellow Taxis in New York City as a proxy for their availability.  Since we have the 
number of rides on Uber and Yellow Taxi, we take a log-odds approach to model the probability 
of a consumer in the neighborhood i during period p on day t choosing Uber over Yellow Taxi. 
The odds are assumed to be a function of the availability of Yellow Taxis in the neighborhood and 
several factors that can affect riders’ preferences such as the intrinsic preference for Uber in that 
neighborhood and in New York City as a whole, weather, time of day, and type of neighborhood. 
If our assumption about the relative importance of monetary and hassle savings is valid, 
there should be a ride distance below which Yellow Taxis should be preferred for the hassle 
savings and above which Uber should be preferred for the monetary savings. We find this indeed 




Given the potential endogeneity of availability of Yellow Taxis, we take two approaches 
to assess the reliability of our finding.  First, we assume that the availability of Yellow Taxis in 
each neighborhood could be endogenous with the demand for and availability of paid 
transportation in the neighborhood.  Specifically, we recalibrate our model including two 
additional covariates as proxies for demand and availability of paid transportation: number of rides 
taken on subways closest to the neighborhood at the time of the ride and the distance to the nearest 
subway station.  Two, we jointly estimate a supply side equation for the availability of Yellow 
Taxis in the neighborhood at the time of the ride as a function of a 1-week lagged availability of 
Yellow Taxis in the same neighborhood at the time of the ride and the demand for and availability 
of public transportation. We include the residual from this equation as an additional covariate in 
the log-odds model.  Findings from both models are very similar to and consistent with those from 
the proposed model and confirm that there is a threshold distance below (above) which Yellow 
Taxis (Uber) is the preferred option. 
We next present relevant literature to our research and develop our framework. Then, we 
provide the description of our data.  Following this, we present our models and discuss our 
empirical results.  We conclude with a summary of our findings and directions for future research. 
1.2 Background 
The sharing economy for services like Uber and Airbnb has grown significantly. The 
growth is driven by technology that “whittled down the barriers to the formation and functioning 
of sharing markets by lowering or eliminating frictions in the identification, search, match, 
verification, and exchange” (Narasimhan et al 2017). Reductions in friction in steps to consummate 




prices typically offered by sharing economy providers (SEP’s) relative to legacy providers (LP’s). 
The second type of savings results from the reduced effort and/or time that consumers need to 
search, identify, and transact with providers. Thus, a consumer does not have to wait for a taxi to 
pass by and can instead hail a ride on Uber. A traveler can find an accommodation at a preferred 
spot in a city easily even in the absence of traditional hotels at that spot. Such reductions in the 
time and/ or effort needed to locate desired services result in what we label as hassle savings. 
These savings can be notable and impact utility. We develop our theoretical framework based on 
the notion that hassle savings would increase the utility of transactions. 
To motivate our research, we start by noting that SEP’s offer the same core services as 
LP’s. For instance, both Uber and taxis provide paid rides and Airbnb provides accommodations 
like hotels do. A key difference between SEP’s and LP’s, however, is in their pricing structures, 
which provides monetary savings (Figure 1.1) based on the ride distance. For instance, Yellow 
Taxis in New York City use a two-part tariff that includes an initial charge of $2.50 for a ride plus 
$2.50 per each mile traveled and 50 cents per minute of idle time. Uber also uses a two-part tariff 
but had a different schedule (during the period of our study) that included a base fare of $2.55 for 
a ride, $1.75 per each mile traveled and 35 cents per minute of idle time. Uber also sets the 
minimum fare to $8 which is the minimum that riders need to pay for any ride (TLC 2017, NYC 
Post 2017). Thus, if consumer preferences were based solely on monetary savings, taxi-cabs 
should be preferred over Uber for rides that are shorter than or equal to a trip distance, 𝑑∗, where 







Figure 1.1: Trip Distance and Trip Cost on Uber and Yellow Taxi  
 
The second difference between SEP’s and LP’s is in the secondary attributes (Keller 2003, 
Kotler and Armstrong 2004, Rust, Zahorik and Keiningham 1996) of their services that can 
enhance or detract from the consumption experience by providing hassle savings.  For instance, in 
some neighborhoods, on some days of the week and some periods of the day (e.g., morning and 
evening rush hours), taxi-cabs may be more easily available if cab drivers find the neighborhoods 
more attractive (Lagos 2000) due to a higher likelihood of finding customers there during those 
days and times. In this case, it would be faster for the consumer to use a traditional taxi-cab rather 
than requesting a ride on Uber through the app, waiting for an Uber driver to accept the request, 
and then for the driver to arrive to give her the ride. The average waiting time for Uber in 2014 
was 3.2 minutes in New York City (Uber 2017). However, this could take a long time if, for 
instance, an Uber driver is not in the vicinity and has to arrive from a different area. The consumer 




cab. In other cases, it may be faster for her to request a ride on Uber than to wait for an empty taxi-
cab to pass by. She may then prefer Uber over a taxi-cab.  
Both options would, therefore, have different customer-transaction costs which are 
“service-related costs” such as “search effort, ease or difficulty in getting problems resolved .. 
required to access or use the service” Oliva et al 1992, p.85). The differences in the pricing 
structures and differences in the availabilities of taxi-cabs and Uber may change the customer-
transaction costs associated with each option and shift consumer preferences between the two.  In 
other words, consumers’ preferences between Uber and taxi-cabs switch based on the total 
transaction costs.   
Overall, therefore, if taxi-cabs are readily available and consumers weigh hassle savings 
more than monetary savings, they may prefer a taxi-cab over Uber even for rides longer than 𝑑∗ 
although the ride on Uber provides monetary savings. In other words, the consumer may prefer 
Yellow Taxi when she is taking trips that are below a threshold trip distance (𝑑∗ + 𝑑𝑤) where the 
total monetary savings by taking a ride on Uber are substantially lower than the total hassle savings 
by taking a ride on Yellow Taxi. 
Above a threshold trip distance (𝑑∗ +  𝑑𝑤) where the total monetary savings by taking a 
ride on Uber start becoming substantially larger than the total hassle savings by taking a ride on 
Yellow Taxi, i.e., consumers start weighing monetary savings more than hassle savings, they may 
prefer waiting on average 3.2 minutes for Uber instead of taking ride on a taxi-cab that readily 
available.  
The differences in the pricing structures and availability of taxi-cabs and Uber, therefore, 




preferences between the Yellow Taxi and Uber. Specifically, we assume that consumers will weigh 
monetary savings less than hassle savings if the former is below a threshold but that the opposite 
will be true for larger savings. Thus, our hypothesis is that: Consumers will weigh monetary 
savings less (more) than hassle savings if the former is below (above) a threshold. We further 
argue this could depend on the neighborhood, as the availability of Yellow taxi and/or Uber could 
vary by neighborhood. We thus hypothesize that Consumers differently weigh monetary and 
hassle savings by neighborhood.    
Figure 1.2: Framework 
 
We also include two variables related to weather conditions in the model. First, mean rain fall 























and finds that drivers are less likely to prefer to drive in the rain due to traffic conjunctions. Brodeur 
and Nield (2016) find an empirical evidence that Uber drivers positively respond to increasing 
demand when it rains. It is intuitive that consumers can wait in offices, homes, or wherever they 
are for Uber, instead of going out in the rain to find a Yellow Taxi. Second, the mean temperature 
which influences demand and supply for rides in NYC. It is very intuitive that people require more 
rides i.e., demand for rides increases when the temperature is cold. While, when the temperature 
getting warmer and hot, more and more people come to the NYC, including travelers, which 
increase the demand. We thus include these two variables to control for variation in demand and 
supply of rides due to weather. 
1.3 Data 
Data for our investigation comes from an individual investigator (Schneider 2015) who 
compiled and made publicly available some of the data that we use1 and the New York City Taxi 
and Limousine Commission (TLC 2017). This Commission maintains detailed records of trip data 
for each Yellow Taxi ride including the origination and destination point (in terms of latitude and 
longitude of each), date of the trip, start and end times of the trip, the number of passengers, 
distance traveled, and the total cost of the trip. Schneider (2015) augmented this data with data on 
weather including temperature and rainfall in New York City for each date during April 1, 2014 
to September 30, 2014, which is the period during which data on all rides taken on Uber in New 
York City is also available and is also our analysis period.  
We consider all trips taken within the geographical boundaries of New York City which 
include the latitude and longitude coordinate set [40.477399, 40.917577] and [-74.259090, -
                                                          





73.700272 (Hafen 2015, Li et al 2014)2. We exclude all the trips with travel distances less than 
0.02 miles and with missing values for any of the variables included in the analysis. We first round 
the latitude and longitude to three digits and identify the top one hundred origination points 
(latitude and longitude pairs) based on the total number of rides at the origination point over the 
investigation period3. We subsequently refer to this set of points as neighborhoods. We next divide 
each day into two twelve-hour periods from 5 AM to 5 PM and 5:00 PM to 5:00 AM. We aggregate 
the rides during each period and obtain the total number of rides, the mean trip distance, and the 
mean number of passengers over each period of each day for each neighborhood.  The Uber dataset 
also contains the latitude and longitude of the origination point, date of the trip, and start-time of 
the trip. We are therefore able to identify all the rides taken on Uber during each period of each 
date of the analysis period from the same hundred neighborhoods that we consider for Yellow 
Taxis.  
Our final dataset thus includes a panel of 100 neighborhoods each of which is observed 
over the 183 days during the analysis period.  Since we divide each day into two periods, the data 
includes 366 observations for each of the hundred neighborhoods for a total 36,600 observations. 
For each neighborhood, we use the first 14 observations to compute lagged variables as discussed 
shortly, the next 280 observations for model estimation and the remaining 72 observations for 
predictive testing of the models.  The dataset, as a whole, therefore is divided into 1400 
observations for computing the lagged variables, 28000 observations for model estimation, and 
                                                          
2 The approach for setting NYC bounding box with coordinates is described at http://hafen.github.io/taxi/#reading-in-
to-r . 
3 There were a total of 62,075 identifiable origination points in the data but the top 100 rides accounted for 15.6% of 




7200 observations for predictive testing. We list below each variable that we compute from the 
data.  
𝑌𝑖𝑝𝑡 = all the rides taken on Yellow Taxis from neighborhood 𝑖 during period 𝑝 of day 𝑡.  
𝑈𝑖𝑝𝑡 = all the rides taken on Uber from neighborhood 𝑖 during period 𝑝 of day 𝑡.  
𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑝𝑡 =  (
𝑈𝑖𝑝𝑡 
𝑌𝑖𝑝𝑡 
) is the odds-ratio of an individual taking a ride on Uber rather than on Yellow Taxi 
from neighborhood 𝑖 during period 𝑝 of day 𝑡. 
𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑝𝑡 = mean trip-distance for rides on all Yellow Taxi from neighborhood 𝑖 during period 𝑝 on 
day 𝑡.  
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑝 = indicator set to 1 for trips between 5 AM and 5 PM and 0 otherwise.  
𝑊𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 = indicator set to 1 if the trip was taken during the weekend (Saturday or Sunday) and 
0 otherwise.  
Type of Neighborhood: We use neighborhood images provided by Google Maps to assign each of 
the 100 neighborhoods to one of four categories: airport, business, leisure or residential 
(Appendix 1). We define four corresponding indicator variables 
𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑖, 𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑖, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖  one of which is set to 1 depending on the category to which 
i belongs and the others are set to zero.    
𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 = average rainfall in inches in the New York City on day t.    




𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑡 = Mean number of passengers per Yellow Taxi ride from neighborhood 𝑖 during period 𝑝 on 
day 𝑡.  
𝑈𝐶𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑡−1 = 1-day lagged share of Uber in New York City. We compute 𝑈𝐶𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑡 as the total 
number of rides on Uber in New York City on day 𝑡 as a proportion of the total number of 
Uber and Yellow Taxi rides in New York City on day 𝑡. We use this variable as a proxy 
for consumer intrinsic preference for Uber in NYC. 
𝑈𝑁𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑝(𝑡−7) = 1-week lagged share of Uber in neighborhood 𝑖 in all Uber rides in New York 
City. We compute 𝑈𝑁𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡 as the total number of rides on Uber in neighborhood 𝑖 during 
period 𝑝 on day 𝑡 as the proportion of the total number of Uber rides in New York City 
during period 𝑝 on day 𝑡. We use this variable as a proxy for consumer intrinsic preference 
for Uber in the neighborhood. 
𝑌𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑝(𝑡−7) = 1-week lagged share of Yellow Taxi in neighborhood 𝑖 in all Yellow Taxi rides 
in New York City. This is our measure of the availability of Yellow Taxis in the 
neighborhood. We compute 𝑌𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑡 as the total number of rides on Yellow Taxis in 
neighborhood 𝑖 during period 𝑝 on day 𝑡 as the proportion of the total number of Yellow 
Taxi rides in New York City during period 𝑝 on day 𝑡. 







Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Continuous Variables  
Variable Mean 
Standard  
Deviation Min Max 
Number of Uber Rides  10.564 13.193 0 235 
Number of Yellow Rides 344.714 208.59 1 1734 
Mean Trip Distance 3.57 3.236 1.3 16.6 
Number of Public Rides 32935.055 30683.201 0 166674.39 
Distance to Subway 0.174 0.137 0.01 0.7 
Mean Temperature 69.04 8.918 39.5 86 
Mean Rainfall 0.135 0.467 0 5.48 
Mean Number of Passengers  1.707 0.113 1 2.42 
Intrinsic Preference for Uber 
in NYC 0.03 0.025 0 0.26 
Intrinsic Preference for Uber 
in Neighborhood 0.001 0.001 0.00 0.03 
Availability of Yellow Taxis 0.002 0.001 0.00 0.01 
Indicator Variables  
Variable Proportion 
Day (5 AM – 5 PM) 0.50 
Weekend 0.28 





1.4 Modeling Approach 
 We use Log-Odds approach to model consumer choice between Uber and Yellow Taxis. 
Specifically, we log-transform 𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑝𝑡 and regress on log-transformed versions of the continuous 
variables as well as the binary variables. We take two approaches, one segment-specific to test our 
primary hypothesis, and second location-specific to test our second hypothesis. Each approach is 




1.4.1 Segment-Specific Model 
ln(𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑝𝑡) ~ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 (𝜇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑝𝑡 , 1)                (1) 




𝐽=1 + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑊𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑖 +
𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖 +  𝛽6𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑈𝐶𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑡−1 +
 𝛽10𝑈𝑁𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑝(𝑡−7)  +  𝜗𝑖𝑝𝑡                       (2) 
𝐶𝑖𝑝𝑡
𝑗
=   {
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1;          1 𝑖𝑓  𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑝𝑡 < 𝐿𝑇𝐷,    0 𝑜/𝑤
                                            
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 2;           1 𝑖𝑓   𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑝𝑡 ≥ 𝐿𝑇𝐷,   0 𝑜/𝑤
}                     (3) 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑝𝑡
𝑗
 represents a latent segment, 𝛾𝑗 represent the effect of availability of Yellow Taxi and 
𝛽 represent the effect of other variables on the choice of Uber over Yellow Taxi, 𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑝𝑡 represents 
the observed trip distance, and 𝐿𝑇𝐷 is represents the latent trip-distance. We assume that 𝐿𝑇𝐷 is 
distributed uniformly over a range spanning a and b the smallest and largest observed trip-
distances respectively in our data. The last term in the equation 2 𝜗𝑖𝑝𝑡 is a random effect term to 
capture the unobserved heterogeneity. We assume that 𝜗𝑖𝑝𝑡 is distributed 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 (0, 𝜎𝜗
2).  
1.4.2 Location-Specific Model  
To investigate whether neighborhoods are heterogeneous, we allow the effects of Yellow 
Taxis’ availability to be neighborhood-specific and replace 𝛾𝑗 with 𝛾𝑗𝑖 in equation 1. 








𝐽=1 + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑊𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑖 +
𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖 +  𝛽6𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑈𝐶𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑡−1 +
 𝛽10𝑈𝑁𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑝(𝑡−7)  +  𝜗𝑖𝑝𝑡                       (5) 
𝐶𝑖𝑝𝑡
𝑗
=   {
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1;          1 𝑖𝑓  𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑝𝑡 < 𝐿𝑇𝐷,    0 𝑜/𝑤
                                            
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 2;           1 𝑖𝑓   𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑝𝑡 ≥ 𝐿𝑇𝐷,   0 𝑜/𝑤
}                     (6) 
1.5 Model Estimation  
We take a Bayesian approach and estimate the parameters of the model using MCMC 
methods available in JAGS (Plummer 2003).  The prior distributions for the coefficients are proper 
but not-informative (Normal with mean zero and large variance), and for the precision term for the 
random term, Gamma distribution with mean one and large variance has been considered. We 
draw two chains of 25,000 samples each with random starting values for the parameters in the 
Markov chain.  We discard the first 15,000 as burn-in and in the remaining samples; we select 
every 5th sample and retain 2,000 draws from each chain (total of 4000 draws) for posterior 
inference. We monitor the convergence of parameters graphically and using Gelman and Rubin’s 
potential scale reduction factor. We use the value 1.1 or lower for monitoring convergence. 
1.6 Results 
We compare the segment-specific and location-specific model specifications based on their 
fit in terms of the Deviance Information Criterion (Gelman et al 2004) as well as on predictive 
performance using root mean squared error (RMSE) and mean squared error (MSE) in predictions. 
Model comparison results in Table 1.2 suggest that both the models are consistent in terms of 




Table 1.2: Model Comparison 
Model DIC RMSE MSE 
Segment Specific 72,095 0.765 0.586 
Location Specific  69,501 0.764 0.584 
 




Constant 1.001 1.001 
Day Time (5 AM to 5 PM) 1.001 1.001 
Weekend 1.001 1.001 
Business 1.001 1.002 
Leisure 1.001 1.001 
Residential 1.001 1.002 
Mean Temperature  1.001 1.001 
Mean Rainfall 1.001 1.001 
Mean Number of Passengers 1.001 1.002 
Intrinsic Preference for Uber in NYC 1.001 1.001 
Intrinsic Preference for Uber in 
Neighborhood 1.001 1.001 
Yellow Availability-Short Distance 
Segment 1.001 Figure 1.3 
Yellow Availability-Long Distance 






Figure 1.3: Location Specific Model – Convergence Statistics for Segment 1 
 
 







We monitor convergence each parameter using Gelman Rubin statistics. Table 1.3 
indicates that all parameters in both the models are converged, as each value is below 1.1. We next 
present the findings from both the models.   
1.6.1 Results of segment-specific model 
We estimate a latent threshold below which the effect of Yellow Taxi availability is 
different from that above. Estimates from the model presented in Table 1.4 are discussed next.  As 
shown in the first column of Table 1.4, the results suggest that the threshold trip distance is about 
seven miles with a significant negative effect of the availability of Yellow Taxi on the odds of 
choosing Uber both below and above the threshold.  Consistent with our prediction, however, the 
reduction in the odds of choosing Uber over Yellow Taxi is larger below (-0.195) the threshold 
than above (-0.074).  
Estimated effects of other variables: The estimated effects of most of the other variables 
are significant and have intuitively meaningful signs. The coefficient for Day, for instance, is 
significant and positive. This is consistent with previous literature on the taxi market (Camerer et 
al. 1997, Farber 2005) that the supply of Yellow Taxis during the day in New York City is lower 
than the demand which should increase the preference for Uber. Not surprisingly, the coefficient 
for Weekend is negative and significant. This could be due to increased availability of Yellow 
Taxis during the weekend thus making them a preferred option relative to having to request and 
wait for an Uber driver.  All three coefficients related to the type of neighborhood are significant 
and positively related to the odds of Uber over Yellow Taxi. Since the base neighborhood category 
in both models is Airport, this suggests that riders prefer Uber over Yellow Taxi for intracity rides. 




central business district where they can easily find customers. For taking a ride on Uber at an 
airport, consumers must go an allotted pick-up point with their luggage or wait for Uber to come, 
but they can easily find a Yellow Taxi outside of the relevant terminal.   
Table 1.4: Estimated Parameters of Segment-Specific Model 
Variable Mean SD 
Constant -0.741 0.021 
Day Time (5 Am to 5 PM) 0.136 0.012 
Weekend -0.281 0.014 
Business/Work 0.816 0.022 
Leisure 0.835 0.023 
Residential 0.879 0.023 
Mean Temperature 0.012 0.007 
Mean Rainfall 0.029 0.006 
Mean Number of Passengers 0.039 0.007 
Uber Popularity 0.200 0.007 
Uber Diffusion 0.455 0.007 
Availability of Yellow taxi in Segment 1 -0.195 0.008 
Availability of Yellow taxi in Segment 2 -0.074 0.014 
Threshold 6.64 
Segment 1 24640 
Segment 2 3360 
Total Number of Observations 28000 
Bold: 95% credible intervals exclude zero.  
With respect to weather conditions, the estimate for mean temperature is positive but not 
significant. The estimate for precipitation is positive and significant suggesting an increase in mean 
rainfall increases the preference for Uber. This is consistent with anecdotal reports (Farber 2005) 




preference for Uber. The coefficient of the mean number of passengers is positive and significant.  
We also find the popularity of Uber in the city and the diffusion of Uber in the neighborhood also 
increase the odds of Uber over Yellow Taxi.     
1.6.2. Results from the location-specific model 
 Results from the location-specific model are displayed in Table 1.5.  
Table 1.5: Estimated Parameters of Location-Specific Model 
Variable Mean SD 
Constant -0.672 0.027 
Day Time (5 Am to 5 PM) 0.110 0.014 
Weekend -0.260 0.015 
Business/Work 0.801 0.031 
Leisure 0.792 0.032 
Residential 0.873 0.031 
Mean Temperature 0.021 0.007 
Mean Rainfall 0.030 0.006 
Mean Number of Passengers 0.012 0.007 
Uber Popularity 0.198 0.007 
Uber Diffusion 0.455 0.010 
Availability of Yellow taxi in Segment 1 Figure 1.5 
Availability of Yellow taxi in Segment 2 Figure 1.6 
Threshold 8.79 
Segment 1 88 
Segment 2 12 
Total Number of Locations 100 




 Consistent with our second hypothesis, the findings from these models indicate that the 
effect of availability of Yellow Taxies does vary across neighborhoods as shown in Figures 1.5 
and Figure 1.6. The effect is also positive in some neighborhoods. Not surprisingly, these results 
could be attributed to the constant supply of Yellow Taxis in New York City which was unchanged 
for several years (Figure 1.8).  








Figure 1.6: Location Specific Model – Segment 2  
 
1.6.3. Robustness Check 
Given the potential endogeneity of availability of Yellow Taxi, we take two approaches to 
assess the reliability of our finding. First, we assume that the availability of Yellow Taxis in each 
neighborhood could be endogenous with the demand for and availability of paid transportation in 
the neighborhood. Specifically, we recalibrate our model including two additional covariates as 
proxies for demand and availability:  
𝑃𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑡 = all the rides taken on public transportation (Subway and Bus) from neighborhood 𝑖 
during period 𝑝 of day 𝑡.  
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 = approximate distance from the center of the neighborhood i to a nearby Subway 




Two, we jointly estimate a supply side equation for the availability of Yellow Taxis in the 
neighborhood at the time of the ride as a function of a 1-week lagged availability of Yellow Taxis 
in the same neighborhood at the time of the ride and the demand for and availability of public 
transportation. We include the residual from this equation as an additional covariate in the log-
odds model.  
Table 1.6: Estimated Parameters of Segment-Specific Model with Outside Goods 
Variable Mean SD 
Constant -0.717 0.021 
Day Time (5 Am to 5 PM) 0.130 0.012 
Weekend -0.309 0.015 
Business/Work 0.813 0.023 
Leisure 0.827 0.024 
Residential 0.851 0.023 
Mean Temperature 0.011 0.007 
Mean Rainfall 0.029 0.006 
Mean Number of Passengers 0.045 0.007 
Uber Popularity 0.200 0.007 
Uber Diffusion 0.445 0.007 
Number of Public Rides -0.042 0.007 
Distance to Subway Station -0.070 0.006 
Availability of Yellow Taxi in Segment 1 -0.191 0.008 
Availability of Yellow Taxi in Segment 2 -0.084 0.013 
Threshold 6.68 
Segment 1 24640 
Segment 2 3360 





Table 1.7: Estimated Parameters of Segment-Specific Model with Control Function Approach 
Variable Mean SD 
Constant -0.749 0.021 
Day Time (5 Am to 5 PM) 0.135 0.012 
Weekend -0.281 0.014 
Business/Work 0.825 0.023 
Leisure 0.845 0.024 
Residential 0.884 0.023 
Mean Temperature 0.014 0.007 
Mean Rainfall 0.029 0.006 
Mean Number of Passengers 0.039 0.007 
Uber Popularity 0.200 0.007 
Uber Diffusion 0.455 0.007 
Availability of Yellow Taxi in Segment 1 -0.208 0.008 
Availability of Yellow Taxi in Segment 2 -0.079 0.014 
Residual in Segment 1 0.101 0.022 
Residual in Segment 2 0.211 0.038 
𝜎𝜗
2 – Unobserved Heterogeneity –Main 0.002 0.006 
Threshold 7.62 
Segment 1 24640 
Segment 2 3360 
Total Number of Observations 28000 
Control Function 
Constant 0.000 0.006 
Lag-7 Availability of Yellow Taxi 0.938 0.006 
Number of Public Rides 0.013 0.006 
Distance to Subway Station 0.005 0.006 




The estimated parameters from these models are reported in Table 1.6 and Table 1.7. 
Findings from both models are very similar to and consistent with those from the proposed model 
and confirm that there is a threshold distance below (above) which Yellow Taxis (Uber) is the 
preferred option. 
1.7 Discussion 
Consumers are increasingly purchasing services through sharing economy platforms as 
they grow in popularity as suppliers and users. It is critical therefore for SEP’s and LP’s to 
understand how consumers choose one of the two options. Sharing economy platforms offer two 
types of savings to consumers. One, monetary savings, results from lower prices typically offered 
by sharing economy providers (SEP’s) relative to legacy providers (LP’s). The second type of 
savings - hassle savings result from reduced effort and/or time that consumers need to search, 
identify, and transact with providers. While they may not be able to compete on monetary savings, 
LP’s can still provide hassle savings. In this research, we investigate whether consumers value the 
two types of savings the relative value they place on each. Specifically, how differences in tariff 
schedules and secondary service attributes such as availability affect consumer choices. Our 
empirical results from an investigation of the ridesharing market in New York City suggest that 
consumers will weigh monetary savings less than hassle savings if the former are below a threshold 
but that the opposite will be true for larger savings.  
1.7.1 Managerial Implication 
Our research provides important managerial implications for LP’s and SEP’s. For 
additional insights on the role of the threshold distance, as shown in Figure 1.7 we plot the trip 




the same, the estimated latent threshold, and the mean empirical trip distances on Yellow Taxi 
rides and on Uber in New York City4 during the investigation period. Consistent with our findings, 
the average trip distance on all Yellow Taxis in New York City is below the threshold trip distance 
and the one for Uber rides is above the threshold (Uber 2014). 
Figure 1.7: Average Trip Cost ($) on Yellow Taxi by Trip-Distance (Miles) 
 
LP’s can, therefore, use hassle savings as a strategic variable to retain market share in the 
short ride-distance segment. As shown in Figure 1.8, while Uber and Lyft have increased the 
availability, Yellow Taxi has not done so in New York City. The Yellow Taxi should increase 
availability in order to retain market share in short distance segment, which accounts for around 
91% of the total rides in NYC (TLC 2014). At the same time, Uber should consider removing 
                                                          
4 We compute the average trip distance for all Uber rides in New York City in 2014 based on the average fare for a 
trip taken on uberX (Uber 2014). For comparison, we compute the average trip distance on all Yellow Taxi rides in 




minimum fare $8, because around 55% of total rides in NYC city in 2014 are with trip distance 
less 2 miles.  
Figure 1.8: Weekly Dispatch of Unique Vehicles by Service Provider  
(January 2010 - January 2017) 
 
 
Our results also have implications for other service providers where differences between 
LP’s and SEP’s in pricing structures and secondary attributes may also affect consumer 
preferences in other shared-economy services. For instance, in the accommodation-sharing market, 
unlike hotels, AirBNB providers can require a minimum number of days of stay by renters. 
AirBNB, however, offers more personalized options and flexibility (Zervas et al 2014) than hotels. 
For example, even when hotels in a location desired by the consumer (e.g., within a few blocks of 
the shopping district) have no availability for the specific days that she needs, AirBNB may list 
several available accommodations in that location during those days.  On the other hand, AirBNB 
providers do not offer features like room service and parking and consumers also face more 
uncertainty than while reserving a room at a branded hotel. The two options would therefore again 




and the opportunity costs of unavailability of the desired dates while those of AirBNB would 
include the monetary costs, the cognitive costs of uncertainty and the opportunity costs of missing 
services. Consumers may, therefore, choose between hotels and AirBNB to minimize total 
transaction costs rather than just the monetary costs.   
1.7.2 Limitations and Future Research  
Since our empirical analysis is based on data from only one city, we cannot generalize the 
findings to other cities because demand for paid rides and supply of service may vary by city. 
However, future studies can consider investigating how the threshold varies, if the data is available 
for other cities as well. This would help us understand more about how consumers weigh monetary 
and hassle savings differently depending on the city. Though we provide some insights on how 
consumers make choices between LPs and SEP’s and how differences in tariff schedules and 
secondary attributes influence consumer choice, there are several avenues for additional research 
in this area. For instance, the role of uncertainty in consumer choice between LP’s and SEP’s and 
how user-generated content like consumer ratings and provider content like photos or videos of 
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First, we convert each longitude and latitude pair (three digits) into an approximate 
physical address using free software provided at http://www.latlong.net. Then, we rely on data 
from Google Maps to identify the type of neighborhood in terms of airport, business (corporate 
headquarters, banks, offices, and other work places), leisure (restaurants, parks, theaters, malls 








Essay 2: Variations in the Strategic Value of Hassle Savings 
2.1 Introduction 
In recent years, the economic importance of a new business model named sharing economy 
has rapidly grown in the accommodation segment of the tourism and hospitality industry.  Airbnb 
has pioneered this model by hosting a digital platform that allows the large-scale rental of 
private/shared rooms and entire houses from individuals to other individuals (Bardhi and Eckhardt 
2012, Zervas et al 2014). While others such as Wimdu, 9flats, and Roomorama offer a similar type 
of service, the Airbnb’s presence throughout the world has rapidly grown, with more than 3 million 
listings across 191 countries as of 2016 (CBRE 2017). Airbnb’s total valuation stands at $30bn, 
joining the league of many of the LP’s such as the Hilton Group at $20bn and Marriott at $34bn 
(Forbes 2017).  
Accommodations are experience goods because amenities and the quality of services may 
vary from provider to provider. Whereas providers know the quality of amenities and service prior 
to the sale, consumers may not, which increases consumers’ uncertainty for features and quality 
of accommodations (Akerlof 1970, Nelson 1970). To reduce uncertainty, consumers, therefore, 
seek information on the features of accommodations before choosing one. Standardization mostly 
provides this information in the case of legacy providers like branded hotels. Sharing economy 
providers, however, cannot rely on standardization since the rented personal accommodations do 
vary across providers. SEP’s, therefore, need to rely on alternative sources of information like 
user-generated ratings and reviews, reputation systems.  
Such reputation systems specifically, are expected to reduce consumers’ uncertainty by 
providing information on the features of accommodations and quality of service through previous 




consumers often seek others’ opinions about products and services. Practitioner research (Kee 
2008) finds that about 68% of online shoppers read at least four reviews before making a purchase. 
Similarly, another practitioner study by Forrester finds that most of the consumers look for user 
ratings and reviews on digital platforms. Above findings suggest that shared accommodation 
consumers may also be interested in reviews and ratings because such a reputation system provides 
hassle savings (reduction in uncertainty). 
In the first essay, we examined variations in the relative value of monetary and hassle 
savings with consumption context. In this essay, we investigate whether the value of hassle savings 
itself varies with consumption context5. If it does, the strategic role of the reputation system that 
provides hassle savings to sharing economy customers will also vary by consumption context for 
providers. The setting for this essay is AirBNB, which implemented a reputation system where 
consumers can rate providers after service consumption (Gebbia 2016, Hawlitschek et al. 2016). 
For empirical analysis, we use the data of 46,738 listings in New York City between April 2016 
and October 2017, which is available through InsideAirbnb, a consulting firm. Specifically, our 
goal is to understand if hosts obtain price premiums for receiving higher ratings from consumers 
and how those premiums vary across consumption contexts.    
In the next section, we review extant literature relevant to our research and develop our 
research framework. Then, we describe our data, sample selection, and modeling approach. 
Finally, we present the results, discuss managerial implications and conclude with limitations and 
direction for future studies.  
 
                                                          
5 We identify 15 consumption contexts based on the combination of five boroughs of New York City and three types 
of accommodations: (1) entire – a house or apartment rented in its entirety (2) private – one room in an apartment 




2.2 Background  
 In this section, we describe how lack-of-information may affect the Airbnb platform, how 
Airbnb is alleviating such problem of lack of information by using a reputation system and develop 
our theoretical framework.  
Accommodations are experience goods because amenities and the type and quality of 
services may vary from provider to provider and consumers face difficulty in observing in advance, 
but these characteristics can be ascertained upon consumption. Moreover, in contrast to the quality 
of a room at a branded hotel, it is relatively difficult to make inferences about features of 
accommodations and service quality on Airbnb, if the provider on Airbnb does not disclose 
information about features and quality so as to obtain a better rental price (Akerlof 1970). The 
providers on Airbnb are fully aware of the features of accommodations and its quality while 
consumers are not, which increases consumers’ uncertainty (Nelson 1970, Spence 1973). In 
general, uncertainty refers to the costs incurred when unexpected outcomes occur as a result of 
lack-of-information. The aim of a customer is to identify the accommodation that meets her 
preferences, compares that accommodation with the alternatives having similar features and then 
to select the most appropriate accommodation with the lowest uncertainty. Consumers, therefore, 
would like to have access to credible information so that they can reduce uncertainty in making 
the purchase decision.  
Prior literature suggests that consumers can rely on different information pieces as a means 
of reducing uncertainty (Luhmann, 1979). For example, price (Milgrom and Roberts 1986, 
Wolinsky 1983), advertising (Ippolito 1990, Kihlstrom and Riordan 1984, Milgrom and Roberts 




Lutz 1989, Riley 1979, Spence 1977), branding (Dawar and Parker 1994) etc. Similarly, Airbnb, 
to provide hassle savings to consumers by reducing uncertainty about features of accommodation, 
has implemented a reputation system where consumers can rate providers after service 
consumption (Gebbia 2016, Hawlitschek et al. 2016). Consumer ratings are generally found an 
effective means for reducing uncertainty by establishing trust between peers (Bente et al. 2012, 
Fuller et al. 2007).  
The reputation system is beneficial for the Airbnb since it provides information to the 
customer about the features and quality of accommodation. This information will give listings with 
higher rating the ability to differentiate themselves from listings lower rating by charging higher 
prices as a return for providing hassle savings (reducing uncertainty). Studies that investigated 
price impact of ratings also suggest that service providers can benefit with such a reputation 
system. For example, Gutt and Herrmann (2015) find that displaying the rating score for the 
corresponding Airbnb host for the first time fetched on an average $3 in price premium in New 
York City. Moreover, the extant literature indicates that different levels of rating scores translate 
into different prices (Edelman and Luca 2014). These authors analyzed the effect of star ratings in 
different sub-categories (location, check-in, communication, cleanliness, and accuracy) on Airbnb 
listing prices, and consistently found higher rating scores to be associated with higher listing 
prices. Wang and Nicolau (2017) who also find similar results quantified the effect - an additional 
star is associated with a price markup of 0.87% of listing price. The above findings of price 
premiums in case of Airbnb are consistent with findings from other settings such as online book 
or shop reviews (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Luca 2016). 
Above literature suggest that Airbnb consumers realize hassle savings by relying on ratings 




this essay, we investigate whether the value of hassle savings itself varies with consumption 
context. If it does, the strategic role of features that provide hassle savings to sharing economy 
customers will also vary for providers. Specifically, our goal is to understand if hosts obtain price 
premiums for receiving higher ratings from consumers, and our hypothesis is that higher average 
rating scores (5.00 vs 4.00-4.99) are associated with higher listing prices. Further, we 
hypothesize that depending on the combination of borough and listing type, these premiums vary 
across consumption contexts. 
Figure 2.1: Framework  
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In addition to the main variable of interest, we include many other variables such as service-
provider-specific factors and time related (Trend and Holiday Season), which also play a role in 
pricing decision.  
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Data and Variables  
We use the data provided by InsideAirbnb, an independent consulting firm that collects 
data from publicly available information from the Airbnb platform. The dataset contains a wide 
variety of information for all the listings on Airbnb for New York City for monthly observation 
times from April 2016 to September 2017. In particular, the dataset includes the price of the listing 
per night, the total number of reviews of the listing, star ratings on a scale from 1 to 5 (converted 
to 0 to 100 scale), the borough in which the listing is located, the room type etc. For empirical 
analysis, first, we select 46,738 listings (625,498 monthly observations) which were listed on 
Airbnb website for at least 6 months during the observation period and have data all the variables 
of interest that we discuss in the following section. Since the distribution of star ratings is skewed, 
where practically all ratings are either 5 (19.8%), 4.00-4.99 (55.5%), or 0 (21.5%) stars, for our 
analysis, we select observations with rating 4.00 or above. This helps us to test the first hypothesis. 
The descriptive statistics for continuous variables and different indicator variables are displayed 
in Table 2.1 and 2.2.   
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a continuous variable to represent log-transformed price per night of a listing i in the 




𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔5𝑠𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i has a 5 star rating in the month 
of t  
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 is a log-transformed continuous variable to represent the number of reviews (volume) 
a listing i has received by the month of t 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a log-transformed continuous variable to represent the number of days a listing i is on 
Airbnb by the month of t  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i renting a room in an apartment 
to single guest in the month of t 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i renting a room in an apartment to 
multiple guests in the month of t 
𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑙𝑦𝑛𝑖 is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i is located in Brooklyn 
𝑀𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑖  is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i is located in Manhattan 
𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖 is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i is located in Queens 
𝑆𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖 is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i is located in Staten-Island 
𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is a log-transformed continuous variable to represent the number of amenities a 
listing i is providing to guests in the month of t 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is a log-transformed continuous variable to represent the number of people a 
listing i accommodates in the month of t 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒1ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i responds to guests within 
one hour in the month of t 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝐹ℎ𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i responds to guests within 




𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑦1𝑁𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i sets minimum stay to one 
night in the month of t 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑦2𝑁𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i sets minimum stay to two 
nights in the month of t 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i allows instant booking in 
the month of t 
𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑖 is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i is exactly in the same location 
as listed on Airbnb  
𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐻𝑖 is an indicator variable to represent whether a listing i is offered by a verified host  
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable to represent whether the host of a listing i a super-host in the 
month of t 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is a log-transformed continuous variable to represent the number of month in the 
observation period  













Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Binary Variables for Proposed Sample  
 
Variable Proportion 
Rating 5 Star 0.263 
Response Time - 1hr 0.356 
Response Time - Few hrs 0.242 
Minimum Stay - 1 Night 0.332 
Minimum Stay - 2 Nights 0.270 
Instant Booking 0.163 
Verified Provider 0.736 










Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Continuous Variables for Proposed Sample  
 
Variable Mean SD MIN MAX 
Price 124.949 70.291 10 399 
Volume 22.423 32.895 1 489 
Tenure 36.504 20.961 0 113 
Amenities 16.227 5.412 2 78 
Accommodates 2.763 1.588 1 16 






2.3.2 Model Specification  
In this section, we develop our hedonic price function for estimating the effect of a 5-star 
rating compared to a 4-4.99-star rating on consumers’ WTP for listings in New York City.  
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔5𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
                              𝛽5𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒1ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝐹ℎ𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
                             𝛽8𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑦1𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑦2𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐻𝑖 +
                            𝛽12𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +
                           𝛽16𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑙𝑦𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽17𝑀𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽18𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽19𝑆𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽20𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 +
                          𝛽21𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                      (1) 
𝑖𝑡~ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 (0, 𝜎
2)                  
where β represent the estimated effect of different variables and 𝑖𝑡is random error term. 
2.3.3 Model Estimation  
We obtain posterior distribution of our parameters in a Bayesian framework using JAGS 
(Plummer 2003).  We use proper but not-informative (Normal with mean zero and large variance) 
prior for beta coefficients, Gamma distribution with mean one and large variance for the precision 
parameter. We draw two chains of 25,000 samples with random starting values for the parameters 
in the Markov chain.  We discard the first 15,000 in each chain as burn-in and in the remaining 
samples; we select every 5th sample and retain total 2,000 from each chain (total 4000 samples) 
for posterior inference. We monitor the convergence of parameters graphically and using Gelman 







In this section, we present the findings from the hedonic model with the selected sample.  We 
estimate a hedonic price function to investigate the impact of higher ratings on listing price. We 
also include many other factors (as discussed in the variables section) into the model to control for 
the effect these factors have on listing prices. Estimates from the model presented in Table 2.3 are 
discussed next. 
The parameter estimate for a higher rating is significantly positive (0.051), which is 
consistent with the prediction. In other words, listings with a higher average rating (5 stars) can 
charge a premium of 5.23%6 compared to listings with a lower rating (4-4.99 stars). Our finding 
of price premium is consistent with findings from other studies in case of Airbnb (Edelman and 
Luca 2014, Wang and Nicolau 2017) and other settings such as online book or shop reviews 
(Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006, Luca 2016) that listings with higher rating can charge premiums 
compared to listing with lower ratings.  
 Estimated effects of other Variables The estimated effects of all the other variables are 
discussed in this sub-section. While a higher average rating score provides Airbnb listings with 
strategic value, (i.e. price premiums), a more reliable rating the number of ratings (-0.003) has 
significantly a negative effect on listing price. This surprising finding can be explained using 
economic theory, assuming the number ratings is a proxy for demand. In other words, the lower 
listing prices are likely to stimulate demand and hence yield more ratings. 
 
                                                          
6 Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) suggests the binary variable measures the discontinuous effect 
on the dependent variable, therefore the percentage impact on the dependent variable is: 𝑔 ∗ 100 =




Table 2.3 Parameter Estimates for Hedonic Price Function 
Variable Mean SD 
Constant 3.894 0.007 
Rating 5 Star 0.051 0.001 
Volume -0.003 0.001 
Tenure 0.058 0.001 
Amenities 0.105 0.002 
Accommodates 0.279 0.001 
Response Time - 1hr -0.005 0.001 
Response Time - Few hrs 0.001 0.001 
Minimum Stay - 1 Night 0.012 0.001 
Minimum Stay - 2 Nights 0.040 0.001 
Instant Booking -0.035 0.001 
Verified Provider -0.013 0.001 
Exact Location 0.000 0.001 
Super-Host 0.073 0.002 
Private -0.541 0.001 
Shared -0.867 0.003 
Brooklyn 0.248 0.004 
Manhattan 0.531 0.004 
Queens 0.142 0.005 
Staten-Island 0.009 0.008 
Trend -0.025 0.001 
Season 0.007 0.002 
Bold: 95% credible intervals exclude zero. 
 Similarly, Instant booking (-0.035) and trend (-0.025) have significantly negative effects 
on listing price. While this is a positive amenity that helps the consumers plan their trip in an easier 




over the period to be more attractive and 2) instant booking to be easier to be reserved to increase 
the demand. 
Airbnb displays explicitly the time at which a provider registered on the platform and 
assigns qualified hosts with a super-host badge. Consistent with intuition, the tenure (0.058) and 
super-host (0.073) variables have significantly positive effects on listing price. As Airbnb actively 
seeks to create a community of long-term engagement (Gebbia, 2016), tenure and super-hosts act 
as a proxy for the reputation of the host. The examination of the other attributes reveals intuitively 
consistent results. For instance, the listings that rent either private rooms (-0.541) or shared rooms 
(-0.867) are able to charge a lower price than listings that rent entire homes/apartments (which is 
our reference category in the hedonic regression). The parameter estimates for markets (boroughs) 
indicate significant geographic differences in listing prices. For example, compared to Bronx, the 
listings in Brooklyn (0.248), Manhattan (0.531), Queens (0.142), and Staten-Island (0.009) can 
charge more price. This result could be due to the variation in real estate or rental prices in 
corresponding markets.  The number of people accommodated (0.279), the number of amenities 
(0.015), minimum stay (one night: 0.012, two nights: 0.040), and season (0.007) all have positive 
and significant parameters. 
2.4.2. Consumption Context Models 
Our findings from the pooled model in the previous section suggest that Airbnb consumers 
realize hassle savings by relying on ratings provided by other consumers to reduce uncertainty 
about the features and services of listings.  The value of the savings, however, would vary with the 
level of uncertainty. Specifically, we hypothesized that uncertainty is likely to be higher under two 




the number of listings and hence the number of ratings is small. We investigate if these are indeed 
the patterns by estimating hedonic models of rental prices for listings in the five boroughs of New 
York City for three types of accommodations: (1) entire – a house or apartment rented in its entirety 
(2) private – one room in an apartment and (c) shared – an accommodation shared by multiple 
consumers.   
In each of the borough-type combinations, we assume that listings that receive an average 
rating of 5.0 are the treatment group and those with ratings of 4.0 – 4.99 are part of the control 
group.  We then use propensity score matching to identify the treatment and control samples for 
each of the combinations.  Table 2.4 shows the number of observations in each treatment and 
control group by sub-sets. We, however, did not have sufficient data for one of the fifteen 
combinations (Shared room type in Staten-Island) and therefore investigate each of the other 
fourteen borough-type combinations. Results from these fourteen models are showed in Table 2.5 
(Entire type by Market), in Table 2.6 (Private type by Market) and in Table 2.7 (Shared type by 
Market).  Estimates of the effect of a higher rating on the price premium are consistent with our 
hypotheses. As shown in Table 2.9 and Figure 2.2, premiums are higher in combinations that have 





















Entire 516 1577 2093 1032 
Private 1148 3567 4715 2296 
Shared 99 243 342 198 
Brooklyn 
Entire 26684 71443 98127 53368 
Private 27590 69145 96735 55180 
Shared 1251 3118 4369 2502 
Manhattan 
Entire 32136 93814 125950 64272 
Private 21707 65166 86873 43414 
Shared 1496 4788 6284 2992 
Queens 
Entire 4237 12058 16295 8474 
Private 5873 18526 24399 11746 
Shared 440 1320 1760 880 
Staten-
Island 
Entire 287 905 1192 574 
Private 463 1285 1748 926 
Shared 0  18 18 0 














Table 2.5: Parameter Estimates for Entire Segment by Market 
Variable 
Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Staten-Island 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Constant 4.114 0.117 3.902 0.015 4.382 0.014 4.029 0.032 4.370 0.163 
Rating 5 Star 0.045 0.026 0.072 0.004 0.057 0.004 0.047 0.009 0.053 0.028 
Volume -0.053 0.012 0.004 0.002 0.010 0.002 -0.005 0.004 -0.058 0.013 
Tenure 0.080 0.013 0.072 0.002 0.033 0.002 0.059 0.005 0.026 0.017 
Amenities 0.066 0.041 0.162 0.005 0.148 0.004 0.097 0.010 -0.128 0.045 
Accommodates 0.261 0.021 0.318 0.004 0.241 0.004 0.316 0.008 0.684 0.024 
Response Time - 1hr -0.069 0.027 -0.014 0.004 0.023 0.004 -0.032 0.009 -0.173 0.033 
Response Time - Few hrs -0.005 0.027 0.000 0.004 0.016 0.004 0.001 0.009 -0.168 0.039 
Minimum Stay - 1 Night -0.091 0.026 -0.014 0.004 -0.016 0.003 0.023 0.009 -0.036 0.031 
Minimum Stay - 2 Nights 0.021 0.024 0.040 0.004 0.044 0.003 0.077 0.009 0.022 0.032 
Instant Booking -0.005 0.026 -0.053 0.006 -0.043 0.005 -0.027 0.012 0.022 0.030 
Verified Host 0.008 0.022 -0.018 0.004 0.000 0.003 -0.064 0.008 -0.133 0.032 
Exact Location -0.052 0.022 0.009 0.005 -0.010 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.090 0.032 
Super-Host 0.007 0.043 0.065 0.007 0.029 0.008 0.047 0.014 -0.003 0.036 
Trend -0.030 0.015 -0.029 0.002 -0.022 0.002 -0.030 0.005 -0.021 0.017 
Season 0.017 0.031 0.000 0.005 0.010 0.004 0.006 0.011 -0.033 0.036 







Table 2.6: Parameter Estimates for Private Segment by Market 
Variable 
Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Staten-Island 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Constant 3.683 0.054 3.548 0.013 3.906 0.016 3.645 0.024 3.612 0.105 
Rating 5 Star 0.098 0.015 0.051 0.004 0.076 0.005 0.031 0.007 0.211 0.027 
Volume -0.019 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.017 0.002 -0.019 0.003 -0.040 0.011 
Tenure 0.067 0.008 0.082 0.002 0.052 0.003 0.067 0.004 0.066 0.013 
Amenities 0.045 0.017 0.087 0.004 0.082 0.005 0.074 0.008 -0.035 0.033 
Accommodates 0.242 0.016 0.262 0.004 0.244 0.005 0.272 0.008 0.317 0.029 
Response Time - 1hr -0.091 0.016 0.003 0.004 0.015 0.005 -0.071 0.008 -0.167 0.028 
Response Time - Few hrs -0.112 0.017 -0.010 0.004 0.023 0.005 -0.020 0.008 -0.093 0.031 
Minimum Stay - 1 Night 0.115 0.015 0.057 0.003 0.068 0.004 0.066 0.007 0.318 0.030 
Minimum Stay - 2 Nights 0.043 0.016 0.068 0.004 0.057 0.005 0.126 0.009 0.266 0.037 
Instant Booking -0.040 0.016 -0.027 0.005 -0.049 0.006 0.022 0.008 0.013 0.027 
Verified Host -0.083 0.015 -0.023 0.003 0.014 0.004 -0.046 0.006 -0.226 0.023 
Exact Location -0.050 0.016 -0.007 0.004 -0.018 0.005 -0.039 0.007 0.058 0.029 
Super-Host 0.075 0.019 0.089 0.007 0.046 0.008 0.066 0.010 0.077 0.031 
Trend -0.025 0.010 -0.031 0.002 -0.024 0.003 -0.020 0.004 0.007 0.015 
Season 0.002 0.018 0.007 0.004 0.011 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.038 0.033 







Table 2.7: Parameter Estimates for Shared Segment by Market 
Variable 
Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan Queens 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Constant 3.721 0.229 3.070 0.069 3.285 0.080 3.573 0.111 
Rating 5 Star 0.082 0.050 0.191 0.023 0.138 0.024 0.124 0.038 
Volume -0.109 0.029 -0.003 0.010 0.018 0.010 -0.016 0.017 
Tenure -0.064 0.048 0.124 0.011 0.167 0.012 -0.001 0.019 
Amenities 0.173 0.048 0.020 0.020 0.106 0.023 0.034 0.035 
Accommodates -0.077 0.062 0.112 0.016 0.238 0.019 0.075 0.026 
Response Time - 1hr -0.054 0.058 -0.151 0.023 -0.129 0.022 -0.150 0.039 
Response Time - Few hrs -0.044 0.072 -0.168 0.023 -0.137 0.022 -0.074 0.042 
Minimum Stay - 1 Night 0.027 0.126 0.253 0.022 -0.023 0.023 0.171 0.036 
Minimum Stay - 2 Nights -0.029 0.144 0.260 0.028 -0.031 0.029 0.268 0.067 
Instant Booking -0.063 0.062 -0.107 0.026 0.004 0.031 -0.085 0.036 
Verified Host -0.106 0.074 0.015 0.022 0.009 0.021 0.086 0.034 
Exact Location -0.291 0.056 -0.025 0.023 -0.039 0.024 -0.032 0.035 
Super-Host 0.190 0.138 -0.001 0.028 0.006 0.043 -0.195 0.047 
Trend 0.076 0.032 0.031 0.013 0.014 0.012 -0.006 0.024 
Season 0.010 0.080 -0.009 0.026 -0.008 0.027 0.093 0.045 







Table 2.8: Average Distribution Intensity (%) of Listings in New York City (Proposed Sample) 
Room Type / Market Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Staten-Island Total 
Entire 0.44% 20.94% 27.02% 3.50% 0.25% 52.14% 
Private 0.99% 20.34% 18.29% 5.15% 0.38% 45.15% 
Shared 0.08% 0.93% 1.33% 0.36% 0.00% 2.71% 
Total 1.50% 42.21% 46.65% 9.01% 0.63% 100.00% 
 
 
Table 2.9: Percentage Impact of Higher Rating on Listing Price  
Room Type / Market Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Staten-Island 
Entire 4.50% 7.20% 5.70% 4.70% 5.30% 
Private 9.80% 5.10% 7.60% 3.10% 21.10% 
Shared 8.20% 19.10% 13.80% 12.40% NA 
Bold: 95% credible intervals exclude zero. 
 
 








Consumers are increasingly purchasing accommodation services through sharing economy 
platforms such as Airbnb as they grow in popularity.  Accommodations are experience goods 
because amenities and the type and quality of services may vary from provider to provider. 
Whereas providers know the quality of service prior to the sale, consumers may not, increasing 
uncertainty (Akerlof 1970, Nelson 1970). It is critical therefore for SEP’s to understand how 
consumers reduce uncertainty about accommodation services and make their purchases. Prior 
literature suggests that consumers seek information on the features of accommodations before 
choosing one to reduce uncertainty. Airbnb has implemented a reputation system where consumers 
can rate providers after service consumption (Gebbia 2016, Hawlitschek et al. 2016). Such 
reputation systems provide consumers with hassle savings (reduced uncertainty), and hence 
providers with strategic value.  The value of the savings should, therefore, be higher in 
consumption contexts with greater uncertainty.  In this research, we investigate whether the value 
of hassle savings itself varies with consumption context.  We hypothesize that uncertainty is likely 
to be higher under two consumptions contexts.  One, where the number of listings in a location is 
very large. Two, where the number of listings and hence the number of ratings is small. Estimates 
of the effect of a higher rating on the price premium are consistent with our hypotheses. Premiums 
are higher in combinations that have fewer listings or have a large number of listings.  
2.5.1 Managerial Implications 
Our findings provide insights into how sharing economy providers can capitalize on the 
reputation system. As the strategic role of features that provide hassle savings to sharing economy 






features that provide hassle savings in contexts where they are valued more but can reduce such 
investments in other contexts.  
2.5.2 Limitations and Future Research  
Though we provide insights into how Airbnb or other service providers can benefit by 
providing information through reputation system to consumers to reduce uncertainty, we 
acknowledge two main limitations of this study. First, we focused mainly on the price impact of 
reputation systems, though we include various other factors. However, no social or psychological 
factors influencing hosts’ price decisions are considered. Therefore, future studies can conduct 
more research to explore the rationale for the hosts’ price increase or decrease decisions. Second, 
due to data limitations, the scope of this study is limited to rentals in the city of New York City. 
Future studies can analyze panel data for a few more cities to generalize the results.   
Though we provide some insights on how consumer prospects reduce uncertainty and make 
their purchase on Airbnb, there are several avenues for additional research in this area. For 
instance, the role of uncertainty in consumer choice between LP’s such as Hotels and SEP’s such 
as Airbnb. How providers’ content like photos or videos of the services can reduce uncertainty is 
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Essay 3: Social Relationships as Strategic Variable in the Accommodation-Sharing Market 
3.1 Introduction 
The market for accommodation services traditionally involves consumers and prospects 
renting accommodations from legacy providers (LP’s), such as hotels. Sharing economy service 
providers (SEP’s) like Airbnb has shaken up this model by hosting digital platforms that allow the 
large-scale rental of private/shared rooms and entire houses from individuals to other individuals 
(Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012, Zervas et al 2014). While others such as Wimdu, 9flats, and 
Roomorama offer a similar type of service, the Airbnb’s presence throughout the world has rapidly 
grown, with more than 3 million listings across 191 countries as of 2016 (CBRE 2017). Airbnb’s 
total valuation stands at $30bn, joining the league of many of the LP’s such as the Hilton Group 
at $20bn and Marriott at $34bn (Forbes 2017).  
Due to Airbnb’s affordable and authentic experiences with a range of accommodations, the 
number of consumers staying at Airbnb hosts has been rapidly growing. Since Airbnb’s founding 
in 2008, approximately 140 million consumers stayed at Airbnb hosts worldwide, including nearly 
80 million in 2016, up from 40 million in 2015 (Airbnb 2017). In terms of revenue for the period 
October 2015 to September 2016, over 416,000 Airbnb hosts in the United States generated an 
estimated $5.7 billion, which was a 140% increase over the preceding 12-month period (CBRE 
2017). 
In contrast to rides (as in Essay 1) that are search goods – ride distance does not vary across 
providers - accommodations are experience goods because amenities and the type and quality of 
services may vary from provider to provider. Consumers, therefore, seek information on the 






information in the case of legacy providers like branded hotels. Sharing economy providers, 
however, cannot rely on standardization since the rented personal accommodations do vary across 
providers. Consumers, therefore, need to rely on alternative sources of information like user-
generated ratings and reviews (as in Essay 2). We found that Airbnb reputation system provides 
consumers with hassle savings (reduced uncertainty), and providers with strategic value (price 
premiums).   
An additional source that sharing economy providers have been offering is information on 
whether the host or any previous renters of a shared accommodation are acquaintances of a 
prospective renter. Airbnb, for instance, offers this through a feature called social connections that 
allows visitors to see only those accommodations reviewed by their friends or friends of friends 
on Facebook. The feature thus provides hassle savings by reducing search costs and can, therefore, 
be a strategic variable in the accommodation market. We investigate its effect in this research. 
Our empirical analysis involves data on the search and time to the first purchase of a sharing 
accommodation by those who register on the Airbnb site.  We examine two outcomes: (1) whether 
or not a purchase occurs (2) time to purchase if one occurs.  The data includes 35,741 consumers 
who registered between January 2014 and June 2014. For our empirical analysis, we select 4,316 
consumer prospects who have used social connection feature at least once. We use a proportional 
hazards model to relate time to first purchase to our primary variable of interest – social 
connections.  We operationalize social connections as the number of times that a registered user 
uses the social connections feature before making the first purchase or terminating the search 
without a purchase. We also control for the effects of demographics (gender and age), how a 
registered user first arrived at the Airbnb site (e.g., via a link on Facebook or a search engine), and 






purchase/non-purchase of an accommodation as a binary logit related to the same variables and 
model the two outcomes jointly in a Bayesian framework.  Our findings indicate a significant effect 
of social connections in reducing the time to, and increasing the likelihood of, the first purchase.   
The social connections variable could, however, be endogenous with search time.  Those 
who have friends on Facebook may be more experienced online users and hence, faster in 
searching and more willing to purchase, online. Additionally, they may be using the social 
connections feature only because it allows them to see which of their friends may be hosts or had 
used accommodations they are also considering. We take two approaches to investigate whether 
there are alternative explanations for our findings.  First, we use propensity score matching (PSM) 
with 4,316 consumer prospects who have used social connection feature at least once as the 
treatment group matched with those who do not use this feature and re-estimate my models on the 
pooled sample.  We use the signup method, which indicates whether people used Facebook/Google 
to set up an account on Airbnb before searching for accommodations.  We also use age as a 
matching variable as a proxy for experience with- and interest in- using social media and learning 
about friends’ activities.  Results from this re-estimation are consistent with our findings and 
indicate that social connections are indeed reducing search time and increasing the likelihood of a 
purchase.   
Second, we exploit possible geographic differences in the hassle savings’ value of social 
connections to validate our findings.  Specifically, we hypothesize that the value of hassle savings 
should be larger when someone is searching internationally rather than domestically in the US 
since uncertainty should be higher with the former.  We, therefore, re-estimate our model with 
geographic-specific estimates of the effects of social connections.  We do find that the effects are 






international listings than domestic ones. Our research has several managerial implications. It 
provides insights into how sharing economy platforms can shorten the time taken by prospective 
customers to make their first purchases through the platforms.  
In the next section, we discuss extant literature relevant to present research and develop 
our theoretical framework. In section 3, we discuss our data and modeling approach. Finally, we 
discuss the results and managerial implications and conclude with limitations and direction for 
future studies.   
3.2 Background 
3.2.1 Reasons for Delay 
Several research studies have investigated why people delay their decisions or tasks in 
different contexts: daily tasks (Milgram et. al.1988), personal projects (Lay 1986), and term-paper 
writing by students (Solomon and Rothblum 1984). In consumers’ purchase decisions context, 
Greenleaf and Lehman (1995) developed comprehensive typologies of reasons why consumers 
delay purchase decisions and suggest that the delay time considerably exceeds the active decision 
time (time used for gathering additional information, evaluating different alternatives, and making 
the actual purchase decision) and studying total delay time would explain why one purchase 
quickly while the others delay for months. Authors developed six propositions: (1) perceived lack 
of time to devote to the decision, (2) shopping for the product is unpleasant, (3) perceived risk, (4) 
seeking advice from others, (5) procedural uncertainty, and (6) gathering more information on 
alternatives. Though there are many reasons behind consumer decision to delay the purchase in 
the general shopping context, one of the most critical reasons for the delay is reducing “perceived 






3.2.2 Perceived Risk 
Since the introduction by Raymond A. Bauer in 1960, the concept of “perceived risk” or 
“uncertainty” has been widely studied over the past six decades in the marketing literature (Bauer 
1960).  According to Bauer (1960, p. 390), “Consumer behaviour involves risk in the sense that 
any action of a consumer will produce consequences which he cannot anticipate with anything 
approximating certainty, and some of which at least are likely to be unpleasant”. Cox (1967) 
suggests that a decision situation is risky when a consumer is uncertain about the consequences of 
her choice. Cunningham (1967, p. 37) conceptualized perceived risk in terms of two similar 
components, namely; the amount that would be lost (i.e. that which is at stake) if the consequences 
of an act were not favorable, and the individual’s subjective feeling of certainty that the 
consequences will be unfavorable.  
Though perceived risk has been defined in many ways in literature, in sum, all the 
definitions of perceived risk suggest that consumers face a certain level of risk or uncertainty while 
making purchases. Previous studies in the marketing literature have used six different risk 
dimensions to explain consumers’ purchase decisions: performance, financial, physical risk, 
social, psychological, and time or convenience risk (Stone and Gronhaug 1993). Jacoby and 
Kaplan (1972) distinguished between five risk dimensions such as (1) financial risk (how the 
purchase may affect value-for-money i.e. the possibility that the product will not be worth the cost 
of purchase), (2) performance risk (how the purchase may perform i.e. the possibility that the 
product or service chose might not perform as desired and thus not deliver the benefits promised), 
(3) physical risk (how the purchase may affect our physical well-being), (4) social risk (how the 
purchase might affect what others think of us i.e. the possibility that a purchase will not match the 






think of ourselves i.e. the possibility that a purchase cannot satisfy the consumer’s self-image). 
Roselius (1971) suggested that time-related risk is also another important dimension for studying 
consumer purchase decisions: (6) time-loss risk (opportunity cost of time i.e. the possibility that 
the time for planning, purchasing execution will not be worth).  
Though perceived risk is multi-dimensional, as previously discussed, extant marketing 
literature has widely investigated the role of financial and performance risk dimensions in addition 
to overall risk in consumer choice (Agarwal and Teas 2001, Conchar et al. 2004, Grewal et al. 
1998, Shimp and Bearden 1982, Sweeney et al. 1999). However, social risk (Campbell and 
Goodstein 2001, Stone and Gronhaug 1993) and psychological risk (Dowling and Staelin 1994) 
appear particularly interesting for products that are visible to others and communicate the 
consumer’s self-image such as apparels and electronic gadgets. In cases of services, in addition to 
financial and performance risk, due to the inseparability of service production and consumption, 
consumers’ personal involvement with services causes the social and psychological loss to be more 
salient as well (Mitchell and Greatorex 1993, Murray and Schlacter 1990). Time-loss also feature 
greatly as this type of risk is linked to the total cost of the product or service.  
3.2.2.1 Risk Reduction Strategies 
Bauer (1960) suggests that consumers develop or adopt different strategies to reduce 
perceived risk, which allows consumers to make purchase decision more confidently (for review: 
Mitchell and McGoldrick 1996). Roselius (1971) identifies 11 such strategies: endorsements, 
brand loyalty, brand image, private testing, store image, free samples, money-back guarantees, 






Information seeking is the most convenient and efficient method for consumers to reduce 
perceived risk. Several studies have examined the relationship between perceived risk and 
information search activity and suggest that consumers employ information search as a problem-
solving strategy to reduce perceived risk (Dowling and Staelin 1994 Smith and Bristor 1994, 
Srinivasan and Ratchford 1991). The underlying motivation in the relationship between perceived 
risk and information search is that when consumers make purchases associated with greater 
purchase risk or uncertainty such as expensive products and different services etc., consumers 
increasingly engage in an extensive search for- or seek more- information. Furthermore, since 
services are high in credence qualities, consumers tend to perceive service as risky purchases. Such 
a characteristic of services increasingly promotes pre-purchase information search (Murray, 1991, 
Murray and Schlacter 1990).  
Perceived risk determines not only the level of information search activity but also the 
sources of information (Cox 1967, Locander and Hermann 1979), as different sources meet 
different information needs such as advertisements in general media or in specific media e.g, 
brochures, and word-of-mouth etc. Cox (1967) categorized information sources into three sources: 
(1) marketer dominated, (2) consumer dominated, and (3) neutral. While marketer-dominated 
sources (i.e. packaging, promotion, advertising) were controlled by the marketer, consumer-
dominated sources referred to interpersonal informational channels over which the marketer has 
little control. For example, independent review and ratings by other consumers which provides 
first-hand information about the product or brand (Bansal and Voyer 2000, Mitchell and Vassos 
1997). Neutral sources (i.e. consumer reports, newspapers) were controlled neither by the marketer 
nor by the consumer. If a consumer perceives a particular source of information more reliable and 






For example, Arndt (1967, pg. 294) studied the relations between perceived risk in trying a new 
brand of coffee and word-of-mouth and found that "the high-risk perceivers tended to make more 
effort to seek word-of-mouth information".  
Purchasing known brands is another leading strategy that consumers use to reduce 
perceived risk. Brands act as important heuristic that consumers use to reduce perceived risk while 
making purchases (Bauer 1960, Bauer and Cox 1967, Berthon et al. 1999, Park and Lessig 1981, 
Sheth and Venkatesan 1968, Zeithaml 1981), as brand names in general signal for product quality 
(Rao et al. 1999). As consumers repeatedly purchase the same the brand, they develop brand 
loyalty, which is the most effective in reducing consumer perceived risk (Bauer 1960, Mitchell 
and Greatorex 1993). 
Extant literature suggests that consumers reduce perceived risk by obtaining someone else's 
advice or assistance such as friends, family members, purchase-pals, and salespeople (Amato and 
Bradshaw 1985, Greenleaf and Lehman 1995). Murray (1991) found that service consumers also 
prefer to seek information from family, friends, and peers rather than sponsored promotional 
sources. Mitchell and McGoldrick (1996) suggest that consumer may seek information/opinions 
from family members or friends on a product and use that information alone or together with other 
information of the product in making purchase decisions. Greenleaf and Lehman (1995) suggest 
that “Consumers delay decision making because they rely on advice from others and cannot easily 










The extant literature, however, shows little exploration into the concept of consumer-
focused risk reduction strategies such as social connections, particularly within a domain-specific 
context such as accommodation services in sharing economy.  
A few studies focused on social networks suggests that social networks allow individuals 
to easily share product experiences and information with others (Chen et al. 2011). On these social 
networks, consumers can have social interaction and become familiar with one another, providing 
a possible source of trust (Lu et al. 2010) and social support (Ridings & Gefen 2004). These 
interactions can greatly influence consumers’ willingness to purchase (Gefen 2002). 
3.3.1 Social Connections 
In 2011, Airbnb created social connection feature to provide hassle savings by reducing 
consumers’ perceived risk or uncertainty. This additional source that Airbnb has been offering is 
information on whether the host or any previous buyers of a shared accommodation are 
acquaintances of a prospective renter. It also allows consumers to share Airbnb activity such as 
recent locations visited their Facebook friends who are also on Airbnb (Airbnb 2011). When 
consumer prospects search for listings around the world, they see an avatar if a Facebook friend is 
a friend of the host or has reviewed the host.  
In the context of consumer prospects booking accommodations at Airbnb, based on the 
literature previously discussed, we argue that consumers can use the social connection feature as 
a risk reduction strategy. Social connection feature thus provides hassle savings by reducing search 
costs and can, therefore, be a strategic variable in the accommodation market. Therefore, our 






to find a host is positively associated with the likelihood of booking and hazard rate of 
making the first purchase at Airbnb.   
We further argue that geographic differences in the hassle savings’ value of social 
connections.  Specifically, our hypothesis that the value of hassle savings should be larger when 
someone is searching internationally rather than domestically in the US since uncertainty 
should be higher with the former.   
Figure 3.1: Framework 
 
Finally, we expect consumer characteristics to directly affect the consumer purchase 
decisions. The consumer-related variables include gender, age, signup method, number devices 
used for browsing, and how the consumer is acquired. Extant consumers choice literature (e.g., 
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Guadagni and Little, 1983) suggests individual differences significantly influence consumer 
purchase behavior. We thus examine the effect of demographics on the consumer purchase 
behavior.    
3.4 Data 
Airbnb provides a digital marketplace for individuals to list, discover, and book unique 
accommodations around the world. Consumer prospects can use the web application or the 
android/iOS application. The dataset used in this research is available as part of the Kaggle 
challenge (www.kaggle.com). The dataset consists of demographics, web session records, and 
some summary statistics for users from the USA. The dataset specifically, contains the information 
for each consumer prospects such as user id, language, age, gender, date of creating the account, 
date of first booking, signup method - Facebook, Basic, first device type - Mac, Windows, iPhone, 
etc., affiliate channel. Another dataset contains information about the users’ sessions such as 
action, action type, action detail, device type, and seconds elapsed. We selected a sample of 35,741 
consumer prospects with data on all variables that we considered. For our empirical analysis, we 
select 4,316 consumer prospects who have used social connection feature at least once. We discuss 
our variables in the following section and Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 display the summary descriptive 
statistics for indicator and continuous variables respectively.  
3.4.1 Variables 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 = an indicator variable set to 1 if the consumer prospect i is a female and 0 if the consumer 
prospect is male. 






𝐹𝐵_𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛_𝑢𝑝𝑖 = an indicator variable set to 1 if the consumer prospect i uses Facebook account to 
sign up on Airbnb and 0 otherwise. 
𝐺𝑜_𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛_𝑢𝑝𝑖 = an indicator variable set to 1 if the consumer prospect i uses Google account to 
sign up on Airbnb and 0 otherwise. 
𝑇𝑤𝑜_𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = an indicator variable set to 1 if the consumer prospect i uses Two different devises 
to access Airbnb website and 0 otherwise. 
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒_𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = an indicator variable set to 1 if the consumer prospect i uses three or more 
different devises to access Airbnb website and 0 otherwise. 
𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 = an indicator variable set to 1 if the consumer prospect i was acquired through an 
affiliate website and 0 otherwise. 
𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑖 = an indicator variable set to 1 if the consumer prospect i was acquired through Airbnb API 
and 0 otherwise. 
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 = a continuous variable to represent the number of times the consumer prospect i used 


















Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Binary Variables for Proposed Sample 
 
Variable Proportion 
Occurrence of Reservation 0.459 
Female  0.466 
Sign-Up: Facebook  0.611 
Sign-Up: Google  0.018 
Devices: Two 0.119 
Devices: Three  0.009 
Acquisition Channel: Search Engine Affiliate 0.047 
Acquisition Channel: API Affiliate 0.110 
 
 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Continuous Variables for Proposed Sample  
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Age 32.50 9.16 18 99 
# Times Social Connections Feature Used 16.69 22.21 1 280 
 
3.5 Methodology 
The consumer prospect’s decision to book an accommodation is decomposed into its two 
components—whether or not the purchase occurred and if one occurred, the time to purchase. The 
first component is modeled with a binary logit model and the second with a proportional hazards 
model. 
3.5.1 Model Specification  







𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖(𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒)  ∙   𝐿𝑖(𝑡|𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒)              (1) 




                      (2) 
where 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of explanatory variables, and 𝛽 is a parameter vector. Let 𝑇 be a random 
variable that represents the time to book. Then we can write  
𝑇~𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑙( 𝜆𝛾)                  (3)  
with 𝑓(𝑡) as the density function and 𝐹(𝑡) as the cumulative distribution function. We specify the 
hazard function as 
ℎ(𝑡) =  𝜆𝛾𝑡(𝛾−1) ;   𝑡, 𝜆, 𝛾 > 0                          (4)  
where 𝛾 is a shape parameter and 𝜆 is a scale parameter, which is reparametrized as shown below 
to captures the impact of explanatory variables 𝑌𝑖 on the hazard rate. 
𝜆 = exp (𝜑𝑌𝑖)                  (5) 
Then the log-likelihood function is given by: 
𝐿𝐿 =  ∑ ln [(𝑃𝑖(𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒)  ∙  𝐿𝑖(𝑡|𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒))
𝛿𝑖  (1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒))
1−𝛿𝑖]                    (6) 
where 𝛿𝑖 = 1 if consumer prospect i booked an accommodation and 0 otherwise. 
3.5.2 Model Estimation  
We obtain posterior distribution of our parameters in a Bayesian framework using JAGS 
(Plummer 2003).  The prior specifications for the coefficients of the covariates (all 𝛽’s and 𝜑’s) 
are normal with zero mean and large variance. The prior for shape parameter of the Weibull model 
is 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(0.001,0.001). We draw two chains of 25,000 samples with random starting values for 






the remaining samples; we select every 5th sample and retain 2,000 from each chain (total 4000 
samples) for posterior inference. We monitor the convergence of parameters graphically and using 
Gelman and Rubin’s potential scale reduction factor. We use the value 1.1 or lower for monitoring 
convergence.  
3.6 Results 
We estimate two different specifications to isolate the impact of social connection on the 
consumer purchase decision. A proposed model with social connection variable included, and a 
nested model which does not include the effect of social connection. We compare the model 
specifications based on their fit in terms of the Deviance Information Criterion (Gelman et al 
2004).  Model comparison results in Table 3.3 suggest that our proposed model performs better 
than the competing model in terms of model fit. Gelman and Rubin statistics suggest that all the 
parameters converged (values are less than 1.1). We next present the findings from the proposed 
model.      
Table 3.3: Model Comparison 
 
Model DIC 
No Social Connection  22949 
With Social Connection 22936 
  
3.6.1 Results of booking decision model 
We estimate a binary logit model to understand a consumer prospect’s intent to make a 
purchase. Estimates from this model presented in Table 3.4 are discussed next. The parameter 






likelihood of purchase, indicating as consumer prospects search more times for accommodation 
with social connections feature, the probability of a purchase is expected to increase. This is 
consistent with our theory that consumer prospects reduce search costs and uncertainty with 
accommodations.    
Other estimated parameters:  Parameters related to Sign-up method Facebook, and 
number devices (two and three) used are significant. Specifically, the parameter related to the sign-
up method - 𝐹𝐵_𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛_𝑢𝑝𝑖  (-1.104) is significantly, negatively associated with a purchase 
decision. These results suggest that compared to consumer prospects who used Direct Sign-up i.e. 
Airbnb account, other consumer prospects who used either Facebook account to sign-up are less 
likely to book an accommodation at Airbnb. Both the parameters related to the number of devices 
used by consumer prospects - 𝑇𝑤𝑜_𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 (1.017) and 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒_𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 (1.105) are significantly, 
positively associated with accommodation booking decision. These results are particularly 
interesting, as the probability of booking an accommodation at Airbnb increases as consumer 
prospects use greater numbers of devices. 
3.6.2 Results of time to book model 
We estimate a Weibull model to understand the consumer prospects’ risk reduction 
strategies. Estimates from this model presented in Tables 3.4 are discussed next. The shape 
parameter is less than 1, reflecting a decreasing hazard rate over time. The coefficients of the 
covariates can be interpreted in a manner similar to that in a regression model (Jain and Vilcassim 
1991).  A positive (negative) coefficient means that the rate of booking increase (decrease) as 






The parameter for social connection variable (0.050) suggests that the number of times the 
consumer prospect uses the social connection feature is positively significantly associated with 
hazard rate. This result suggests that consumers rely on social connections to reduce perceived 
risk, which reduces the time taken to book an accommodation. This is consistent with our theory 
that consumer prospects reduce time to purchase by using social connection feature to search for 
accommodation.     







Mean SD Mean SD 
Constant -1.853 0.341 0.208 0.462 
Female Vs Male -0.051 0.047 -0.002 0.065 
Log(Age) 0.044 0.095 -0.001 0.129 
Sign-Up: Facebook Vs Airbnb  -0.098 0.046 -1.104 0.068 
Sign-Up: Google Vs Airbnb -0.152 0.157 -0.200 0.232 
Devices: Two Vs Single 0.663 0.067 1.017 0.116 
Devices: Three Vs Single 0.805 0.200 1.105 0.394 
Acquisition Channel: Search Engine Affiliate Vs Direct 0.149 0.099 0.240 0.187 
Acquisition Channel: API Affiliate Vs Direct 0.008 0.085 -0.071 0.105 
Log(# Times Social Connections Feature Used) 0.050 0.019 0.091 0.027 
Shape Parameter 0.472 0.008  
Bold: 95% credible intervals exclude zero. 
 
Other estimated parameters:  Parameters related to Sign-up method Facebook, and 
number devices (two and three) used are significant.  Specifically, the parameter related to the 
sign-up method - 𝐹𝐵_𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛_𝑢𝑝𝑖  (-0.098) is significantly, negatively associated with hazard rate. 






account, other consumer prospects who used Facebook account to sign-up are expected to take 
more time to book an accommodation at Airbnb. Both the parameters related to the number of 
devices used by consumer prospects - 𝑇𝑤𝑜_𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 (0.663) and 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒_𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 (0.805) are 
significantly, positively associated with hazard rate. These results are particularly interesting, as 
the time taken to make a purchase at Airbnb is reduced as consumer prospects use greater numbers 
of devices. 
Figure 3.2: Observed and Predicted Probability of Purchase  




















Figure 3.3: Change in Likelihood 
 
 












3.7 Robustness Checks 
3.7.1 Endogeneity of Social Connections 
The social connections variable could, however, be endogenous with search time.  Those 
who have friends on Facebook may be more experienced online users and hence, faster in 
searching and more willing to purchase, online. Additionally, they may be using the social 
connections feature only because it allows them to see which of their friends may be hosts or had 
used accommodations they are also considering. While field experiments (randomizing the 
sample) can be a way to avoid such endogeneity, propensity score matching (PSM) can always 
attenuate such endogeneity (Li & Kannan, 2014; Kannan, Reinartz, & Verhoef, 2016).    
We use propensity score matching with visitors who use the social connections feature on 
Airbnb as the treatment group matched with those who do not use this feature and re-estimate my 
models on the pooled sample.  We use the signup method, which indicates whether people used 
Facebook/Google to set up an account on Airbnb before searching for accommodations.  We also 
use age as a matching variable as a proxy for experience with- and interest in- using social media 
and learning about friends’ activities.  Thus, the selected matched sample includes 4,316 consumer 
prospects who have used social connection feature at least once and 4,316 consumer prospects 
who have never used. Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 display the summary descriptive statistics for 
indicator and continuous variables respectively. Results (Table 3.7) from this re-estimation are 
consistent with my findings and indicate that social connections are indeed reducing search time 







Table 3.5: Summary Statistics for Binary Variables for Matched Sample 
 
Variable Proportion 
Occurrence of Reservation 0.475 
Female  0.496 
Sign-Up: Facebook  0.619 
Sign-Up: Google  0.011 
Devices: Two 
0.120 
Devices: Three  
0.006 
Acquisition Channel: Search Engine Affiliate 
0.189 




Table 3.6: Summary Statistics for Continuous Variables for Matched Sample 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Age 32.38 9.17 18 99 

































Mean SD Mean SD 
Constant -1.551 0.262 1.144 0.320 
Female Vs Male -0.105 0.032 -0.034 0.046 
Log(Age) 0.025 0.074 -0.189 0.090 
Sign-Up: Facebook Vs Airbnb  -0.128 0.032 -1.097 0.048 
Sign-Up: Google Vs Airbnb -0.288 0.144 -0.391 0.212 
Devices: Two Vs Single 0.405 0.043 0.690 0.072 
Devices: Three Vs Single 0.491 0.163 0.823 0.295 
Acquisition Channel: Search Engine Affiliate Vs Direct 0.086 0.040 0.088 0.060 
Acquisition Channel: API Affiliate Vs Direct -0.122 0.066 -0.214 0.083 
Social Connections Feature Used Vs Not Used 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 
Bold: 95% credible intervals exclude zero. 
3.7.2 Geographic Differences 
We exploit possible geographic differences in the hassle savings’ value of social 
connections to validate our findings.  Specifically, we hypothesize that the value of hassle savings 
should be larger when someone is searching internationally rather than domestically in the US 
since uncertainty should be higher with the former. We operationalize demographic variable, 
𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 as an indicator variable, and we set to 1 if the consumer prospect i booked an accommodation 
in the domestic market and 0 if it is from a foreign market. We, therefore, re-estimate my model 
with geographic-specific estimates of the effects of social connections.  We do find (Table 3.8) 
that the effects are larger both on the time to make the first purchase and on the likelihood of the 













Mean SD Mean SD 
Constant -1.811 0.324 0.190 0.465 
Female Vs Male -0.051 0.046 -0.001 0.065 
Log(Age) 0.032 0.091 0.004 0.130 
Sign-Up: Facebook Vs Airbnb  -0.099 0.048 -1.103 0.068 
Sign-Up: Google Vs Airbnb -0.154 0.156 -0.197 0.234 
Devices: Two Vs Single 0.664 0.068 1.019 0.119 
Devices: Three Vs Single 0.797 0.196 1.104 0.394 
Acquisition Channel: Search Engine Affiliate Vs Direct 0.149 0.100 0.242 0.182 
Acquisition Channel: API Affiliate Vs Direct 0.012 0.086 -0.074 0.108 
Log(# Times Social Connections Feature Used)   
Pooled   0.092 0.027 
Domestic Reservation 0.045 0.021 
   
  
  Foreign Reservation 0.058 0.025 
Bold: 95% credible intervals exclude zero. 
 
3.8 Discussion 
Consumers are increasingly purchasing accommodation services through sharing economy 
platforms such as Airbnb as they grow in popularity.  It is critical therefore for SEP’s to understand 
how consumers who have never used accommodation services to make their first purchase. 
Consumers are uncertain about the features and quality of accommodation, and this is expected to 
very high for first-time consumers. A source that sharing economy providers have been offering 






acquaintances of a prospective renter. Airbnb, for instance, offers this through a feature called 
social connections that allows visitors to see only those accommodations reviewed by their friends 
or friends of friends on Facebook. The feature thus provides hassle savings by reducing search 
costs and can, therefore, be a strategic variable in the accommodation market. In this research, we 
investigate the time taken to make the first purchase from when the Airbnb service is first 
considered by the consumer prospect including the extreme case of infinite time meaning that the 
choice never occurs. Our findings indicate a significant effect of social connections provide hassle 
savings to consumers in reducing the time to and increasing the likelihood of, the first purchase.   
3.8.1 Managerial Implications 
Findings provide insights into how sharing economy platforms by using social connections 
feature can shorten the time taken by prospective customers to make their first purchases through 
the platforms. For example, consumers prospects now have a more personal way to search for 
unique accommodations around the globe on AriBNB. With over million nights booked through 
Airbnb to date, chances are someone a consumer know has already used Airbnb. On top of being 
able to search for accommodation that friends or someone in the network have reviewed, Social 
Connections also allows people to find unique places to rent from hosts who are direct friends, 
friends of friends, or share similar affiliations. Hotels also can implement such a feature to be 
competitive. Social connections can be used as a strategic variable to provide consumers hassle 








3.8.2 Limitations and Future Research  
Though we provide insights into how consumers of Airbnb or other service providers can 
benefit by providing information through social connection feature to reduce uncertainty, we 
acknowledge two main limitations of this study. First, we focused mainly on consumer prospects. 
However, findings from existing customers purchase behavior or usage of social connection 
feature is also important to generalize the findings. Second, we did not include other uncertainty 
reduction strategies such as reading reviews by other customers. Therefore, future studies can 
incorporate data from existing customers and other variables into analyses.  
Though we provide some insights on how consumer prospects reduce uncertainty and make 
their first purchase on Airbnb, there are several avenues for additional research in this area. For 
instance, the role of uncertainty in consumer choice between LP’s such as Hotels and SEP’s such 
as Airbnb. How providers’ content like photos or videos of the services can reduce uncertainty is 
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A guest seeking to rent a room or property on Airbnb can enter the desired destination (e.g., 
destination, city, address etc.,), dates (Check In and Check Out), and number of guests (e.g, Adults, 
Children, and Infants) then view a variety of options including room type (Entire home, Private 
room, or Shared room), other property features and characteristics, price, and availability. Figures 
3A.1-3A.3 present screenshots of key steps in the search process, including initial listings (1), main 
search (2), search filters, (3) property listing, and (4) a listing details including listing details, host 
photo and name, and reviews from prior guests. To book a room or property, the guest uses 
Airbnb’s request and payment systems: Airbnb presents the guest’s request to the host who accepts 
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